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Context-Dependent Biodiversity Conservation 
Management Regimes: Theory and Simulations 
 
 
Abstract: Ecosystem degradation has motivated a search for successful conservation 
approaches. The perceived failure of state-directed protected areas in the tropics has 
prompted experimentation with community management and co-management 
strategies. Numerous case studies suggest that none of these are effective universally.  
There exists, however, little analytical or empirical work to identify under what 
conditions one arrangement will be more effective than another. This paper develops 
a model of state-dependent equilibrium conservation management design that 
identifies the comparative advantage of different managers, in the interest of 
appropriately locating authority for conservation tasks as a function of prevailing 
biophysical, economic, and sociopolitical conditions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many of the world's ecosystems are in rapid states of decline. The collapse of fisheries, 
disappearance of tropical rainforests, destruction of coral reefs, and air and water pollution 
threaten the lives of humans and the other species with which we share the planet. Most of these 
problems can be attributed to the presence of externalities, which causes a divergence between 
individually and socially optimal behavior and leads to under-investment in some socially 
desirable activities and over-investment in other, socially undesirable ones. For example, when 
individuals lack incentive to consider the benefits that accrue to others from the existence of a 
common pool resource such as a fish stock, or a public good such as biodiversity, they 
commonly overexploit the natural resource base. Garrett Hardin famously termed this 
overexploitation of open access resources "the tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). Since 
then, much effort has been mounted towards identifying institutions that can change incentives 
that lead to overexploitation and thereby eliminate this externality problem. Similarly, 
researchers and policy-makers have explored mechanisms that increase contributions to a public 
good and discourage free riding. 
As the problem of overexploitation of open access resources became clearly recognized, 
the usual prescription was to turn them over to the state, which would presumably manage these 
resources for the public good. State control has often meant restricting access through protected 
areas and national parks. These approaches have a long history of fairly successful conservation 
in wealthier countries such as the United States and Canada, as well as in some middle-income 
countries such as South Africa. Similar models were applied to tropical areas throughout the 
1950s to 1970s, but have often failed to conserve biodiversity, due to poor enforcement, weak or 
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corrupt governments, and conflicts created between those protecting the park and those requiring 
use of resources within the park.  
The perceived failure of this state-directed “fences and fines” approach to tropical 
biodiversity conservation has prompted experimentation with a number of alternative 
approaches. In particular, various forms of community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) and co-management are being hailed as “win-win” situations that meet the needs of 
both wildlife and human populations and prevent the loss of biodiversity (Getz et al. 1999; 
Western and Wright 1992). The state-directed approach commonly disregarded the ability of 
some communities to manage resource use effectively, thereby destroying some functioning 
traditional management systems (Berkes and Folke 1998; Ostrom 1990). This recognition led to 
a proliferation of writing about successful cases of collective action, which has in turn fed the 
current fashion of decentralization and devolution of resource management authority to 
community groups.  
Community-based conservation strategies proceed from the assumptions that local people 
have intimate knowledge about their environment and if they are given authority over their own 
resources, they will better protect them. In situations where local residents are the main 
beneficiaries of maintaining healthy ecosystems (e.g., rangeland grazing, soil conservation, 
forest woodlots), communities can often be the foundation for effective conservation 
management (Baland and Platteau 1996). Most international development agencies and 
conservation organizations now fund “community-based management” or “co-management” 
projects. At least 60 countries are decentralizing some aspects of natural resource management 
(Ribot 2002). Despite the appeal of community-based and co-management schemes, numerous 
case studies suggest that their effectiveness in conserving biodiversity is far from uniform and 
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seems to depend heavily on the biophysical and socioeconomic context of conservation (Agrawal 
2001; Barrett et al. 2001; Baland and Platteau 1999; Wells and Brandon 1992; Ostrom et al. 
1990).  
Some researchers question the utility of the search for a single, universally “best” 
institutional design for conservation and ask whether different arrangements are perhaps 
appropriate for different settings (Barrett et al. 2001; Ostrom et al. 1999; Hobley 1996). To date, 
however, there has been little analytical work that explores how key variables interact and 
determine when one arrangement will be more effective than another. Some notable exceptions 
are Skonhoft and Solstad (1996, 1998), who consider when different tools for reducing poaching 
activity (e.g., changes in probability of detection, size of penalty, prices, property rights) will be 
appropriate.  
Empirical work has been mostly descriptive, with little analytical, much less prescriptive 
content. Particular case studies consider different factors that affect the success of a conservation 
approach, thus comparison of cases and testing of hypotheses is difficult, if not impossible 
(Agrawal 2001; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995). Furthermore, context-specific institutional 
design can be politically unappealing. Mary Hobley writes: 
“As Ostrom (1994) so cogently argues, it is not an either/or situation but an ‘and’ 
situation where there are many arrangements that can be accommodated ranging 
from partnerships between government and local people to complete local control. 
Using this notion of a continuum there are a variety of institutional arrangements 
that could be selected according to the particular context. This approach requires 
site specificity and a high degree of social contextual understanding from the 
implementing or facilitating organisation. To date, although appealing to 
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academics in its recognition of complexity and diversity, it has been resisted by 
government institutions used to the prescriptive model-based approach to 
development.” (Hobley 1996; p100) 
 
Some valuable work exists on design principles for particular conservation institutions. 
For example, Ostrom’s principles for successful small-scale common pool resource institutions 
are well-known (Ostrom 1990). Others have proposed conditions for successful protected areas 
or community-based management schemes (Brandon et al. 1998; Hobley 1996). It is unclear in 
many of these analyses, however, whether the conditions are necessary or sufficient, whether 
there is a prioritization of conditions (i.e., can conditions be ranked in terms of their relative 
impact on success), and whether failure to meet some of the conditions suggests the need for 
strengthening those aspects, or for a different management approach altogether. A general theory 
to explain what works best where and why would help practitioners in choosing appropriate 
conservation designs. 
This paper adapts models from the agrarian contracts literature (Bell 1989; Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1985) to offer a predictive and prescriptive theory of conservation design, in terms of 
locating authority for specific conservation tasks, as a function of prevailing biophysical, 
economic, and sociopolitical conditions. The purpose of the paper is to illustrate how different 
contextual conditions may affect which type of institutional design will be most appropriate, and 
to provide a simple theoretical framework for beginning to consider these questions in a more 
rigorous fashion. 
We begin in Section II with a presentation of the basic model. Section III specifies 
functional forms that allow us to obtain closed-form solutions. Section IV presents model 
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solutions and simulations. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
The basic problem of conservation revolves around two issues, (i) the existence of 
multiple tasks necessary to conserve a natural resource (e.g., resource mobilization, rule 
enforcement), and (ii) externalities surrounding each of the several activities involved in resource 
conservation or exploitation. Conservation is not a single act, but a suite of tasks demanding 
different sets of skills. Who should perform a given task depends, according to the principle of 
comparative advantage, on agents’ relative ability for conducting that activity, which may be 
conditioned by other exogenous factors (e.g., skill or resource endowments).  Just as 
conservation agents must, collectively if not always individually, perform multiple tasks, so do 
they have objectives that transcend a unitary focus on conservation. Parties evince different 
degrees of care about conservation, whether for intrinsic or instrumental reasons.  Successful 
institutional designs for conservation must take into account both differences in parties’ interest 
in conservation and differences in their abilities to undertake the tasks necessary to conserve a 
resource.  Underlying variation in the biophysical, economic, or sociopolitical context can affect 
these factors, inducing variation in the most appropriate institutional design of conservation.  
For the purposes of simplifying a terribly complex reality into a tractable model that 
highlights the key relationships at play, we consider the case of two agents who must, in some 
combination, perform two different conservation-related tasks. The agents in the model are 
"government" and "community.” Both community and government welfare vary positively with 
ecosystem health.  Government refers to the national (or local) government and community 
refers to a unitary composite of individuals who extract resources from the ecosystem at stake. 
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Of course, in reality communities and governments are composed of many actors with divergent 
interests and priorities. We abstract from these intra-group politics and co-ordination problems 
that complicate resource management, although these features can be considered to some degree 
in our model, as we explain later. Although our categorization is a gross oversimplification of 
rich socio-political-cultural reality, it will be adequate to illustrate some basic points that apply to 
contexts in which there are multiple scales of stakeholders in the conservation challenge.  
While conservation involves a wide range of activities, in order to present a clear, 
tractable model of the basic problem we similarly reduce the many tasks involved in 
conservation to two: financing and management. Conservation financing generates funds 
necessary to cover the costs of conservation activities (e.g., purchasing equipment for monitoring 
and enforcement, providing adequate compensation to attract and retain skilled and committed 
staff, creating infrastructure, or making physical improvements to the ecosystem), preferably 
from those who benefit from conservation of the ecosystem at stake, i.e., by internalizing the 
positive externalities associated with conservation. This stylized financing function could also 
represent nonfinancial contributions such as scientific expertise and training. Management refers 
to making and enforcing the rules that govern resource use so as to maintain or improve the 
ecosystem, especially by internalizing the negative externalities associated with resource 
exploitation. Both these activities consume scarce resources that could be allocated to other 
desirable activities, so each party would rather the other incur the costs of conservation.  
We assume that community members do not receive compensation for participating in 
conservation activities.  Their benefit is derived purely from improving ecosystem health, which 
in turn increases their marginal productivity of labor in resource extraction. We believe this 
assumption to be consistent with current practices in community-based conservation, where 
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community members are mainly encouraged to voluntarily participate in management and 
enforcement activities under the assumption that this will encourage feelings of ownership over 
the resource and avoid financial dependence on outsiders. 
We assume that both agents have different abilities in the two conservation tasks. We 
represent community financing ability as fc, community management ability as mc, government 
financing ability as fg, and government management ability as mg. We assume the government is 
at least as efficient as community in financing, due to its superior powers of taxation and access 
to external donors. The community, meanwhile, is at least as efficient as government in 
management, due to its proximity to the resource, superior information about individual users’ 
activities and the condition of the ecosystem, and lower cost opportunities to sanction 
undesirable behaviors. Obviously this assumption will not hold in all cases: which agent is more 
able in which task will vary. The point is that different agents have different abilities, and for the 
purposes of modeling, we choose a specification that we believe to be plausible for a number of 
cases, although we make no claims as to the universality of its applicability.  
In what follows, it will be useful to think of government and community ability in the 
two conservation tasks as relative efficiencies. Government is at least as efficient as community 
in financing: one hour of community financing time is equivalent to only a fraction, fc/fg, of 
government fundraising time. Community is at least as efficient as government in managing: one 
hour of government management time is equivalent to only a fraction, mg/mc, of community 
management time. Government relative financing efficiency and community relative 
management efficiency are normalized to one without loss of generality.  
The key to the design of the model and to the resolution of conservation externalities lies 
in recognizing that 1) multiple activities impact ecosystem functioning, from which more than 
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one agent benefits, directly or indirectly, and 2) there exists an externality between the two 
agents.  Neither has incentive to consider the benefits that accrue to the other from a healthy 
ecosystem. This results in less labor spent on conservation and more labor allocated to resource 
extraction in equilibrium than is socially optimal. Although the particular instruments used for 
resource management and enforcement (e.g., individualized resource tenure, social sanctions, 
fines, credible shoot-to-kill instructions to guards, etc.) and for generating the resources needed 
to cover conservation costs (e.g., conservation concessions, nonextractive resource 
commercialization, taxation, etc.) are of great importance, we abstract from those choices in this 
paper. We concern ourselves only with who performs the task, and not with the instrument(s) 
they use. We model this as a problem of labor allocation subject to a time constraint, although it 
could equally be recast as a general resource allocation problem.  
The state of the ecosystem, E, depends on the (labor) resources applied to each of our two 
stylized conservation tasks, as well as on labor applied to resource extraction, and the initial state 
of the ecosystem: 
E = E[I, Lf, Lm, Lcd]         [1] 
where I is the initial state of the ecosystem , Lf is effective community or government fundraising 
labor (accounting for the differential abilities mentioned earlier), Lm is effective community or 
government management labor, and Lcd is community resource-extractive labor. The state of the 
ecosystem is increasing in both fundraising and management labor and decreasing in resource-
extractive labor. We model fundraising and management labor as affecting the ecosystem 
directly, for tractability purposes. Fundraising labor generates capital, which can be used to 
purchase ecosystem-enhancing goods. Assuming capital is generated from labor through a fixed 
proportions technology and the price of capital is normalized, we can restrict ourselves to 
 10 
 
modeling Lf. We assume that management labor improves the state of the ecosystem through 
activities that cause the area to be maintained or improved, for example, restrictions on 
harvesting technologies or areas that can be harvested. We assume further that management labor 
decreases the impact of extractive labor on the ecosystem, ∂2E/∂Lcd∂Lm <0, for example by 
causing a shift to less destructive extraction technologies.  
Besides allocating labor to conservation tasks, the community uses labor in income-
generating activities, Lcd (resource-extractive labor), and Lcn (non-extractive labor). Non-
extractive labor generates a wage, wn, and extractive labor generates a product, D (fish, for 
example), which can be sold in the market at price pd. We assume that community has access 
rights to the resource and can thus extract as much as they wish of the product. Management 
labor, however, limits the effect of the extractive labor on the resource. The resource can be 
viewed as common property, where all of the community members have property rights to the 
resource, but management by community or government can limit these rights. It is further 
assumed that “community” is the only resource-harvester. This is an obvious oversimplification, 
as outsiders often play a large role in resource-exploitation and exacerbate the difficulties of 
resource management. Including outsiders in our model, however, would not change the 
qualitative results under our assumption that the community holds comparative advantage in 
local management and enforcement of conservation rules. If one were to incorporate exogenous 
pressure on the ecosystem by outsiders (e.g., through some addition to the Lcd term, this added 
cost would merely induce increased management effort by government and community, each 
according to their comparative advantage. 
The production function for the extracted product (e.g., fish) is:  
D =  D[E, Lcd]         [2] 
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We assume the production function is concave in both inputs, thus there are diminishing 
marginal returns to extractive labor and ecosystem quality (δD/δE>0, δ2D/δE2<0, δD/δLcd>0, 
δ2D/δLcd2<0). Extractive labor inputs increase production by more than do ecosystem “inputs” 
(δD/δLcd>δD/δE). We assume the marginal product of extractive labor is increasing in ecosystem 
quality (∂2D/∂Lcd∂E >0). For example, as there are more fish in the lake, less labor is required for 
a given catch and the marginal productivity of a given amount of labor is higher. If resources are 
expended on conservation, thus increasing E, this thereby increases the community’s incentive to 
allocate labor to extractive production at the margin.  Hence the externality effects that give rise 
to the resource management problem. 
The community’s objective is assumed to be income maximization, where income is1: 
Yc = wnLcn + pdD         [3] 
Community chooses the quantities of labor that maximize its income, subject to the labor 
constraint: 
Lc = Lcd + Lcn + Lcf + Lcm        [4] 
where Lc is total labor time. This captures the essence of the community’s management 
challenge: given its finite resources on the one hand, and its dependence on the natural resource 
stock, on the other, is the community best-served by expending scarce resources on various 
conservation tasks, or can it be better served by leaving this to others or partnering with others by 
sharing responsibility and authority.2 
Government provides labor for conservation tasks, Lgf and Lgm, and labor, Lgo, for other 
government services. We assume it has a limited amount of labor, Lg, which is defined by its 
budget constraint.3 Government welfare, which may represent its perceived responsibility to its 
constituency, is defined over the provision of these other services and the state of the ecosystem4: 
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Wg = Wg[E, Lgo]         [5] 
We assume a fixed proportions production technology for government services so that provision 
of government services can be adequately modeled through the choice of Lgo.  
Conservation occurs under one of three possible types of arrangements, or pseudo-
contracts, between government and community: the government performs both conservation 
tasks (government management), the community performs both conservation tasks (community 
management), or each performs the task in which they have a comparative advantage (co-
management). For tractability, we assume complete specialization in the case of co-management. 
Obviously, in reality conservation contracts lie along a continuum, with many permutations 
involving other combinations of agents and tasks. However, these three contracts will suffice for 
illustrating our basic points.  
The government offers one of these “contracts” to community, and the community 
chooses the amount of labor to apply to its various tasks. For example, if the government chooses 
government management, community will allocate labor between resource extraction and wage 
labor. If the government chooses community management, community allocates labor between 
conservation financing, management and resource extraction and wage labor. Note that the 
community can choose to allocate none of its labor to conservation tasks, which is equivalent to 
rejection of the contract. For this reason, community participation constraints are not necessary 
to this model. The government knows the community’s objective function and offers the contract 
that maximizes its own welfare5. 
The familiar solution technique in such noncooperative game settings is to derive the 
offeree’s best response function and then to solve the offerer’s optimal contract offer conditional 
on that known best response (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985). The first step in solving this particular 
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model is to solve the community’s income maximization problem, subject to its labor constraint 
and obtain optimal community labor allocations conditional on government labor allocations. 
Then we solve the government’s welfare maximization problem, subject to its labor constraint 
and the community’s optimal response. We derive government welfare for each contract case.  
Government should choose that arrangement offering it the highest level of welfare. Note that in 
this principal-agent model, the “optimal” contract is therefore that which maximizes government 
welfare, which is a function of ecosystem health, but not of community income. This could 
represent the case, for example, of a government agency that has the mandate to protect the 
environment subject to a budget constraint.  No claim is being made that the “optimal” contract 
is that which is socially optimal. 
 
III. FURTHER SPECIFICATIONS 
In order to solve the model, we must specify functional forms. So we let  
E = I[LfLm / Lcd]         [6] 
where Lf is effective community or government fundraising labor (fc/fg Lcf and Lgf, respectively) 
and Lm is effective community or government management labor (Lcm and mg/mc Lgm, 
respectively). This simple representation of the ecosystem is the most parsimonious 
representation that maintains the key properties that labor allocated to fundraising or 
management improves the state of the ecosystem, while labor allocated to resource extraction 
decreases ecosystem quality. We assume a fixed proportions production technology so that 
changes in E can be readily measured in units of labor. 
The production function for the extracted product is Cobb-Douglas:  
D =  EαLcdβ where 0 < α, β <1 , β>α      [7] 
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Community welfare is thus defined as Yc = wnLcn + pdEαLcdβ. We assume that at Lcd=0, the 
derivative from the right hand side (βpdEαLcdβ-1) must be greater than wn, so that the community 
always chooses a positive level of resource-extractive labor. We define government welfare as 
Wg = AEχ + BLgo where A>B, 0<χ<1      [8] 
Our specification of government welfare obviously disregards the politics inherent in 
government decisions of what activities it values. Governments have different objectives and 
different preferences, and these change over time. Any collective choice, however, can be 
represented in its reduced form, and our objective function could represent a variety of 
government preferences. For example, the parameters A and χ effectively represent 
government’s relative preference for ecosystem services, the values of which could vary across 
periods or regimes.  
The relative importance of the pattern of comparative advantage and the relative abilities 
of the two agents is conditioned by exogenous factors such as the scale of the externality, ρ (the 
degree to which conservation of the resource yields benefits to people outside of the community 
or government), the size of the ecosystem, η, community instability, σ (weakness of leadership, 
excessive immigration/emigration, lack of traditional ties, etc.), and government 
undependability, µ (degree to which outsiders believe government will not use funds for their 
stated purposes). Without loss of generality, let ρ≥1 and the other three parameters fall into the 
closed unit interval [0,1].  These variables have been deemed relevant to the success of 
community management by a number of studies (Agrawal 2001; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 
1995).  
We make the following additional simplifying assumptions, which are illustrated in Table 
1.  The parameter ρ is conceived of as the size of the population interested in conserving this 
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ecosystem or, relatedly, the aggregate willingness to pay of the global population for 
conservation of the resource.  As the scale of the externality increases, both community and 
government ability in raising funds increases because a larger population derives benefits 
(perhaps existence or option value) from the resource (δfi/δρ>0). Thus it will take less effort per 
monetary unit raised, on the part of either government or community, to generate funds for 
conservation when the resource has widespread appeal.6 We further assume that community 
ability increases at a decreasing rate (δ2fc/δρ2<0), as opposed to the government’s constantly 
increasing ability (δ2fg/δρ2=0), reflecting government’s absolute advantage in inducing those 
outside the ecosystem to contribute to its conservation. This captures the notion that when the 
size of the externality is small (i.e., locals receive most of the conservation benefit), there is less 
difference between government and community efficiency in generating resources for 
conservation than when the size of the externality is large. If the benefits of conservation flow 
mainly to local resource users (e.g., conserving soil and water on a farmer’s plot), then 
government is unlikely to possess superior capacity to generate the resources necessary to 
conduct conservation operations. On the other hand, if the share of benefits that accrue to locals 
from maintaining an ecosystem (e.g., preserving a large tract of biodiverse rainforest) is 
relatively small, then government may be better positioned to recoup the costs of conserving this 
ecosystem. The basic idea is that government’s comparative advantage in raising conservation 
funds grows with the share of the benefits from the resource accruing to persons outside the 
community.  All else held constant, a large externality will tend to lead to greater inflow of funds 
than a small externality, and government will be better able to take advantage of this broader 
pool of prospective funding. 
As the size of the ecosystem increases, government and community management ability 
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both decrease, because size increases the complexity of the task. But this decrease is slower for 
government, since government’s jurisdiction covers a greater area than that of the community 
(δmi/δη<0, with δmc/δη < δmg/δη). As government dependability decreases, perhaps due to 
corruption, incompetence, or political instability, government financing capacity declines 
(δfg/δµ<0). Similarly, as community instability increases, its capacity to make and enforce rules, 
and thus its management ability, decreases (δmc/δσ<0).7 The community stability and the 
government dependability parameters could partly reflect the degree of group heterogeneity, as 
discussed earlier. For example, a community with many competing interests may be considered 
as having low cohesion or stability, resulting in a high value of the parameter, σ. Similarly, the 
presence of individual agendas and rent-seeking behavior in government could be seen as 
contributing to government undependability, or a high value of the parameter, µ.  
In accordance with our previously discussed assumptions, we assume that community 
financing ability, fc, equals ρ1/2, government financing ability, fg, equals ρ/µ, community 
management ability, mc, equals 1/ση, and government management ability, mg, equals 1/η1/2. 
Community relative financing efficiency, fc/fg, thus equals µ/ρ1/2, and government relative 
management efficiency, mg/mc equals ση1/2. Recall that community relative management 
efficiency and government relative fundraising efficiency are normalized to one.  
While this is only a stylized model and the tasks and assumptions about abilities are 
somewhat arbitrary (though their relative magnitudes appear realistic for many cases), the 
purpose of this paper is to illustrate that different relative abilities in conservation activities and 
other contextual variables yield different equilibrium conservation schemes. This basic point 
holds regardless of the particular tasks chosen or the assumptions about who is more efficient at 
what task. The results we present in the next section are directly related to the particular 
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functional forms chosen, but the qualitative patterns that emerge are generalizable and important. 
In what follows, we therefore emphasize only the qualitative results; the particular numerical 
values convey no real information.     
 
IV. MODEL SOLUTIONS AND SIMULATIONS 
We now solve the principal-agent optimization problems for the three possible 
conservation “contracts.” 
 
Contract Option #1: Government Management (Lgf>0, Lgm>0, Lcf=0, Lcm=0) 
Under this contract, the community’s income maximization problem becomes:  
Max Yc = wnLcn + pd EαLcdβ        [9] 
s.t. Lc = Lcd + Lcn 
   E = I[Lgf(ση1/2)Lgm / Lcd]       
Solution of the first order necessary conditions yields community optimal labor 
allocations and maximal community income under government management.8 
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Knowing this best-response labor allocation rule, government then solves its own welfare 
maximization problem: 
Max Wg = AEχ+ BLgo =        [13] 
s.t. E = I[Lgfση1/2Lgm / Lcd*]      
 Lg = Lgf + Lgm + Lgo       
Solution of the first order necessary conditions yields government optimal labor 
allocations and maximal welfare under government management: 
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Once we have repeated this exercise for the other two possible contracts, we can compare 
Wg* under each arrangement to establish which conservation contract best serves government’s 
interests. In general, there is no unambiguous ordering possible between the maximal 
government welfare attainable under each of the contracts. The equilibrium conservation contract 
depends fundamentally on the context, as captured by the model’s parameters. The optimization 
problems for the other two cases are as follows. We leave detailed presentation of contracts 2 
and 3 to the Appendix.9  
 
Contract Option #2: Community Management (Lgf=0, Lgm=0, Lcf>0, Lcm>0) 
If the government offers community this contract, then the community’s income 
maximization problem can be represented as: 
Max Yc = wnLcn + pdEαLcdβ        [18] 
s.t. Lc = Lcd + Lcn + Lcf + Lcm 
   E = I[(µ/ρ1/2)LcfLcm / Lcd] 
Government uses the community’s known optimal choice of Lcd*, Lcf*, and Lcm* to solve 
its own welfare maximization problem: 
Max Wg = AEχ + BLgo         [19] 
   s.t. E = I[(µ/ρ1/2)Lcf*Lcm* / Lcd*] 
Lg = Lgo 
 
Contract Option #3: Co-Management (Lgf>0, Lgm=0, Lcf=0, Lcm>0) 
In this final of the three contractual options facing government, the community’s problem 
becomes: 
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Max Yc = wnLcn + pdEαLcdβ        [20] 
s.t. Lc = Lcd + Lcn + Lcm 
   E = I[LgfLcm / Lcd] 
The government’s problem and its optimal choices and maximal welfare conditional on 
these community best-responses are: 
Max Wg = AEχ + BLgo         [21] 
s.t. E = I[LgfLcm*/Lcd*] 
Lg = Lgo+Lgf 
Government chooses the contract that maximizes its welfare. Gathering together the 
results from the optimization problems, government welfare under the three types of contracts is 
as follows: 
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2. community management 
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3. co-management 
Wg* = 
1
1
1
1
)()( −− 

 −−

 −+ χχχ
χχχ
χχχ
χχ
χα
αβ
χα
αβ
AI
B
AI
BBLg
      [24] 
 
One can now readily determine which contract will be chosen at different relative 
efficiencies subject to any particular set of starting values. For what follows, we use a base case 
where I = 2, wn = 1, pd = 2, Lc = 1, Lg = 1, A = 1.4, B = 1, α=0.1, β=0.4, and χ=0.5.  
One key point to make is that the equilibrium contract turns fundamentally on the relative 
efficiency of each party in the two constituent tasks necessary for successful conservation.  This 
can be depicted graphically, as in Figure 1, which partitions the relative efficiency space 
according to the contract type that prevails, given the base case scenario.10 These results are not 
unique to the parameter values; the general pattern results for most choices of values. What does 
change with different combinations of parameter values, is the switchover point between 
contracts, a key point which we explore below, and which is presented in Table 2. 
When both relative efficiency values are low, meaning there is a great difference in agent 
efficiency in both tasks, co-management is optimal because specialization according to 
comparative advantage generates substantial aggregate gains, even though the positive 
externalities associated with ecosystem quality means neither party enjoys the full benefit of its 
efforts. This will be the case when both µ/ρ1/2 and ση1/2 are small, i.e., when government 
credibility is high and/or the scale of the externality is large, and the size of the ecosystem is 
small and/or community stability is high.  
A co-management scheme that is somewhat representative of our specification of co-
management is the Soufrière Marine Management Area in the Caribbean island nation of St. 
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Lucia. In response to threats to reefs on the west coast of the island of St. Lucia, local fishermen, 
hoteliers, dive operators, government agencies, and community groups negotiated an agreement 
to form the Soufrière Marine Management Area. Management activities are primarily carried out 
by a community-based local NGO (the Soufrière Regional Development Foundation, SRDF), 
with technical assistance from the Department of Fisheries. The SRDF is comprised of 
representatives of all major stakeholders and makes decisions about rules in the area. External 
funding has been provided by USAID (through the Government of St. Lucia ENCORE project), 
the French government and the Caribbean Conservation Association. In this case, the size of the 
protected ecosystem is fairly small (fringing coral reefs along 10km of coastline), government 
credibility is fairly high, the scale of the externality is large (coral reefs provide tourism 
opportunities, ecosystem services, as well as local benefits such as fishing), and the community, 
although not necessarily homogeneous or stable, seems to have its various interests represented 
effectively by the SRDF (SMMA 2003; Brown and Pomeroy 1999; Pomeroy 1999).  
Through specialization, co-management exploits the comparative advantage of each party 
in a given task. However, co-management will not always be optimal, due to the externality 
problem inherent in this approach. Since agents only consider their private return from their 
contribution of conservation labor, they will provide less labor than is socially optimal. 
Government and community both want to free ride under co-management, but since they both 
value ecosystem quality, there is a limit to their willingness to free ride. If their free riding entails 
enormous losses of ecosystem health (as in the case when the other party’s relative efficiency 
equals zero), then the gains from free riding are, under the relatively mild modeling assumptions 
imposed, excessive relative to the costs.  But as the efficiency differences between the two 
parties lessen and the gains from specialization decrease, then it may become optimal to move 
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towards a system where one agent performs both tasks. 
As government becomes less efficient at fundraising, i.e. µ/ρ1/2 increases, but community 
is still relatively efficient at managing, i.e. ση1/2 is low, community management becomes 
optimal. This will be the case when government credibility is low and/or the scale of the 
externality is small, and the size of the ecosystem is small and/or community stability is high. An 
example of this could be found in some community forestry schemes in Nepal. For example, the 
Kamal Nahar Forest User Group (FUG) in Haththipur in the Terai Region of Nepal was made 
responsible for the ‘development, conservation and utilization’ of a national forest in 1997. 
Although the ownership of the forest land remains with the state, the FUG is responsible for all 
management of the area. Some user groups receive external funding for community forestry, but 
in Haththipur the village residents pay the costs of management and they feel that the benefits 
will eventually outweigh these costs. In this case, the size of the ecosystem is small (canal side 
plantation of 5.5 ha), the scale of the externality is small (the “forest” is of little value to anyone 
outside the community), government credibility is somewhat low, and community stability is 
fairly high (the community is fairly homogeneous and well-organized, and in-migration is low 
and confined to nearby villages) (Chakraborty et al. 1997).  
As community becomes less efficient at managing, i.e. ση1/2 increases, but government is 
still relatively efficient at fundraising, i.e. µ/ρ1/2 is small, government management becomes 
optimal. This will be the case when government credibility is high or the scale of the externality 
is large, and the size of the ecosystem is large and/or community stability is low. This could 
represent the case of the United States, for example, where the system of national parks financed 
and managed by the central government has been relatively successful for ecosystem protection. 
In this case, government credibility is high, the scale of the externality is fairly large (national 
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parks benefit Americans and others with recreation opportunities and ecosystem services), the 
size of the ecosystem is often fairly large (e.g., Yellowstone), and community stability is fairly 
low (there is substantial migration within the U.S.).  
While the basic pattern described above will result quite generally, the point of 
switchover from one contract to another depends on the levels of the other parameters, i.e., on 
other elements of the biophysical, economic, and sociopolitical context of conservation. Thus, as 
the values of the parameters of the model are changed, the contract space changes from that 
depicted in Figure 1. So whether government management or community management or co-
management is optimal depends not only on the relative efficiency of the parties in the two tasks, 
but also on other exogenous factors that help to define the context. We conducted simulations on 
the critical values and found several interesting results, which are discussed below and presented 
in Table 3. Note that some of these results are sensitive to the range within which the parameter 
of interest is varied. In all figures, the solid lines represent the base case scenario from Figure 1, 
to permit easy comparison. 
We first consider a change in pd, the market price of the exploited resource. At low levels 
of pd, government management prevails. Figure 2 demonstrates this result with pd=1.7. A falling 
market price for the extracted resource, relative to the wage rate for non-extractive labor, gives 
community less of an incentive to invest in the environment, since extractive labor is yielding 
relatively lower returns. It instead prefers to allocate most of its labor to non-extractive activities 
and receive wages wn. Thus unless community is highly efficient in management, relative to 
government, government chooses to perform the conservation activities itself to ensure that an 
adequate amount of labor is allocated to conservation. As the value of pd decreases even further, 
community management (as well as co-management) drops out of the picture, and government 
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becomes the sole provider of labor for conservation tasks. On the other hand, when pd rises, 
community prefers to allocate its labor to resource extraction, thus they will value ecosystem 
quality more highly (since returns to extractive labor depend positively on the state of the 
ecosystem) and will choose to allocate high levels of labor to conservation management and 
fundraising. Government thus becomes assured of a relatively high level of ecosystem quality, 
and can allocate its labor to providing other services. Figure 2 shows how the area covered by 
government management diminishes. In this case (pd=2.3), community management dominates 
the scene. At higher levels of pd, the contract space is covered entirely by community 
management.   
These results may seem counterintuitive in the context of standard open access resource 
models, which typically show that price increases fuel greater exploitation, implying that greater 
management is required to maintain the stock. Therefore one might not expect government to 
turn management over to communities. In our model, however, as prices increase, community 
not only exploits more, it also has a greater interest in maintaining the more valuable stock.  Any 
individual should have the incentive to harvest more under higher prices, but the community has 
the ability to regulate and manage harvest under the common property assumptions underpinning 
our model.  
We now consider a change in A. This effectively represents the relative importance the 
government places on protecting ecosystem quality. At low levels of A, community management 
prevails. Figure 3 shows that at A=1.3, community management covers most of the contract 
space, with government management and co-management only occurring when community is 
highly inefficient in fundraising. As A decreases further, community management covers the 
entire contract space. On the other hand, as A increases, the area covered by community 
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management and co-management diminishes, to be replaced by government management. Figure 
3 illustrates this result with A=1.6. When government cares relatively little about ecosystem 
quality, it is less willing to provide conservation management and fundraising labor and turns 
these responsibilities over to community. As government becomes more interested in providing a 
high quality of environment, however, it takes over these responsibilities, to ensure the level of 
ecosystem quality it desires.  
At low levels of I, the initial quality of the ecosystem, the contract space is dominated by 
community management. This can be seen in Figure 4 for I=1.4. As I increases, however, 
government management prevails. Figure 4 shows these results for I=2.6. This can be explained 
in that as I increases, the ecosystem is more valuable so government takes over conservation 
responsibilities to ensure it is protected. 
Devolution of state conservation authority and responsibilities should thus not necessarily 
be taken as a sign of government commitment to conservation, as some CBNRM advocates 
suggest. As this simple model demonstrates (through the variations in A and I), it might instead 
signal state abdication of responsibility due to disinterest. Michael Dove argues that the 
resources over which communities are granted authority are often those resources with no other 
claimants. He argues that “today’s search for ‘new’ sources of income for ‘poor forest-dwellers’ 
is often, in reality, a search for opportunities that have no other claimants – a search for 
unsuccessful development alternatives ” (Dove 1993). For example, community forestry in 
Nepal began with the Department of Forests handing over to communities land that was either 
barren or covered by degraded forests, with the objective of aforestation (Hobley 1996). 
Furthermore, devolution may simply be politically or economically attractive to governments by 
passing on the costs of conservation to the poor in the name of participation and self-help 
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(Hobley 1996).   
The simulations discussed above illustrate that the optimal biodiversity conservation 
contract is context-dependent. Even in such a parsimonious model as the one developed here, the 
equilibrium contract proves a complex function of interacting parameters describing the 
biophysical, economic and sociopolitical setting. Cross-sectional externalities and heterogeneity 
in skill at performing essential conservation tasks generate predictable variation in the optimal 
conservation management regime that seems to correspond reasonably well with observed 
patterns.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper illustrates how the choice of conservation management regime is conditioned 
by a number of contextual and ability-related variables.  We model the problem as one of 
identifying the contract between a government and a community, each of which allocate 
fundraising and management labor for conservation, that optimally balances the inefficiencies 
due to the externality inherent in shared enjoyment of a healthy ecosystem against the efficiency 
gains realizable from skill differences in performing different activities necessary to protect the 
environment. When both agents are relatively efficient in just one of the essential activities for 
conservation, then co-management is the equilibrium contract. As the efficiency differences 
between the parties lessen, it becomes optimal for one or the other party to undertake both 
activities so as to reduce the externality problems associated with co-management. Whether we 
should expect a move toward community-based or state-managed conservation depends on the 
underlying biophysical and socioeconomic context.  Changes in exogenous model parameters 
can induce substantial adjustments in the equilibrium partitioning of relative efficiency 
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parameter space between different arrangements.  Seemingly identical relative abilities produce 
different equilibrium arrangements in different contexts while differing relative abilities often 
generate different conservation management designs within a single biophysical, economic and 
sociopolitical context. 
The critical relative efficiencies, at which point it becomes desirable to switch from co-
management to government or community management, depend on the values of the other model 
parameters.  For example, we saw that a decrease in the market price for the exploited resource 
leads to switchover to government management at lower levels of government management 
efficiency than occur at higher prices. The same is true for increases in government value of 
ecosystem quality. Better understanding of these switchover points could improve the choice of 
conservation contract design for a given site.  
This model offers a strong caution against a one-size-fits-all approach to conservation 
management and the current fashion of devolution of management authority and CBNRM and 
co-management schemes without careful consideration of context. The model provides a possible 
explanation for why the national parks system of government biodiversity conservation may 
have been effective in the some settings, such as the United States, but not others, such as much 
of tropical Africa, and why, analogously, community-based conservation has not been uniformly 
successful.  
Enhancements such as allowing intra-community heterogeneity, intertemporal 
preferences, bargaining between the community and the government over contract terms, and 
non-linear ecosystem dynamics, may improve the model’s predictive and prescriptive power 
with respect to effective biodiversity conservation management design. But the parsimonious 
model presented here lays out the basic foundation of a useful predictive and prescriptive theory. 
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Empirical testing is the most important next step, both to improve the assumptions of the model 
and to test model predictions. For now, however, this model serves simply to illustrate why the 
preferred conservation contract may be context-specific. Neither government management, nor 
community management, nor co-management, is appropriate under all conditions.   
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VI. APPENDIX: SOLUTIONS TO CONTRACT OPTIONS 
 
Contract Option #2: Community Management (Lgf=0, Lgm=0, Lcf>0, Lcm>0) 
If the government offers community this contract, then the community’s income 
maximization problem can be represented as: 
 
Max Yc = wnLcn + pdEαLcdβ        [25] 
s.t. Lc = Lcd + Lcn + Lcf + Lcm 
  E = I[(µ/ρ1/2)LcfLcm / Lcd] 
Solution of the first order necessary conditions yields community optimal labor 
allocations and maximal income under community management. 
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Government uses the community’s known optimal choice of Lcd*, Lcf*, and Lcm* to solve 
its own welfare maximization problem: 
 
Max Wg = AEχ + BLgo         [31] 
   s.t. E = I[(µ/ρ1/2)Lcf*Lcm* / Lcd*] 
Lg = Lgo 
Solution of the first order necessary conditions yields government optimal labor 
allocations and maximal welfare under community management. 
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Contract Option #3: Co-Management (Lgf>0, Lgm=0, Lcf=0, Lcm>0) 
In this final of the three contractual options facing government, the community’s problem 
becomes: 
 
Max Yc = wnLcn + pdEαLcdβ        [34] 
s.t. Lc = Lcd + Lcn + Lcm 
   E = I[LgfLcm / Lcd] 
Solution of the first order necessary conditions yields community optimal labor 
allocations and maximal income under co-management. 
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The government’s problem and its optimal choices and maximal welfare conditional on 
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these community best-responses are: 
 
Max Wg = AEχ + BLgo         [39] 
s.t. E = I[LgfLcm*/Lcd*] 
Lg = Lgo+Lgf 
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ENDNOTES
                                                 
1 We abstract from other potential community interests, for tractability of the model. 
2  There is obviously an intertemporal allocation problem as well since time spent on Lcf or Lcm 
improves the future state of the ecosystem and, by law of motion [1], potential future income 
from resource extraction.  We ignore the intertemporal issues, however, in order to concentrate 
attention on the central issues of externalities and differential productivity across complementary 
conservation activities.  Adding dynamics merely refines the basic story we present.  
3 For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from the related public finance problem.  One could 
readily let the government levy a lump sum tax to finance its activities without changing any of 
the results to follow.  A more realistic, ad valorem tax merely adjusts the magnitudes by creating 
a further externality, but does not change the qualitative results of the model.  
4 This specification implies that government values the state of the ecosystem and thus that there 
is some long-term interest represented by government.  Although we do not present these 
comparative statics below, as one reduces the value government places on the environment, 
reflected in the parameter χ introduced shortly in equation (8), government becomes less 
interested in conservation and thus is less frequently the resource manager in equilibrium.  
5 Objections have been raised to the principal-agent framework in agrarian contracts models, in 
that it assumes the agent has no bargaining power to increase its share of the gains from 
contracting (Bell 1989). Although our framework could be extended to a bargaining model, here 
we are simply concerned with the gains from contracting, and not with the distribution of these 
gains.  
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6 This of course, depends on the mechanism used for eliciting these funds. The Nash equilibrium 
for a voluntary contributions mechanism is to give nothing, regardless of the size of the benefit 
one would derive from provision of the public good. However, the simple observation that public 
television and radio continue to operate, and charities continue to receive contributions, suggests 
that people do contribute some positive amount. The amount of the contribution is probably 
some proportion of one’s willingness to pay, which will be larger if the total benefits from the 
public good are larger. 
7 Note that we are not referring to stability in a dynamic sense. The essence of the community 
stability variable is anything that affects its ability to set and enforce rules or otherwise resolve 
externalities. 
8 We consider only the interior solution in the optimization problems, such that strictly positive 
amounts of labor are used in each activity. Since this paper is based on the notion that multiple 
functions are necessary for conservation, the corner solutions are inherently uninteresting.   
9 In an effort to conserve space, the final expressions for equilibrium community labor 
allocations, community income, and state of the ecosystem are not presented in the paper. These 
can be made available to interested parties upon request. 
10 The curves separating optimal contracts in the efficiency parameter space in this and all other 
figures reflect exact computations based on the declared parameter values. 
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Table 1: Effect of Parameters on Relative Efficiencies 
 
Parameter 
 
Effect of increase on 
abilities 
 
Effect of increase on relative 
efficiencies 
 
Community 
instability, σ 
 
↓ mc 
 
↑ mg/mc (government relative 
management efficiency) 
 
Size of ecosystem, η 
 
↓ mg, ⇓ mc 
 
↑ mg/mc 
 
Government 
undependability, µ 
 
↓ fg 
 
↑ fc/fg (community relative 
fundraising efficiency) 
 
Scale of externality, ρ
 
⇑ fg, ↑ fc 
 
↓ fc/fg 
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Table 2: Effect of “Context” Parameters on Equilibrium Contract 
  
Community relative fundraising efficiency 
 Low 
σ small, η small 
High 
σ big, η big 
 
Low 
µ small, ρ big 
 
Co-management 
 
Government 
Management 
 
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t r
el
at
iv
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
 
High 
µ big, ρ small 
 
 
Community 
Management 
 
? 
 
 
 41 
 
Table 3: Comparative Statics: Effect of Change in Parameter Values on Dominant 
Equilibrium Contract 
 
 
Parameter 
 
Decrease 
 
Increase 
 
Pd 
 
Government management 
 
Community management 
 
A 
 
Community management 
 
Government management 
 
I 
 
Community management 
 
Government management 
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Figure 1: Optimal Contract in Relative Efficiency Space 
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Figure 2: Changing the Market Price of the Exploited Resource 
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Figure 3: Changing Relative Importance of Ecosystem to Government  
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Figure 4: Changing Initial Ecosystem Quality 
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